Anti-War March at the DNC: But Where Were the People?

August 27, 2008

I happen to live in Denver, and recently was tapped by a local community radio station dnc.kgnu.org to report on the news during the Democratic National Convention (DNC) (For an audio version of this post, see here ). This position means that for the past weeks, and all during the DNC itself, I have been attending community meetings, reporting on demonstrations, interviewing delegates, and witnessing the DNC program at Denver’s various convention sites.

But if the street demonstrators had their way, none of the thousands of journalists in Denver for the DNC would be covering the events inside the staged convention hall at all—rather we would all be covering the drama in the street as tens of thousands of demonstrators showed up in Denver to shut the whole show down.

Protestors Call For Action

On the website of dncdisruption08.org, the street activists issued their call to action.

Unconventional Action’s strategy at the Democratic National Convention will hold the Democratic Party accountable for promoting unjust policies: environmental degradation, the enforcement of arbitrary borders, attacks on the poor, complacency in war, and racist policing.

We will expose to the nation that the Democrats and Republicans are two sides of the same coin, both parties funded by the same corporations and upholding the same unjust political system which fails to meet the needs of the vast majority of people. Anarchists and Anti-Authoritarians are urged to engage in a broad variety of tactics to disrupt fundraising events and prevent Democratic delegates from voting for no-choice candidates. Unconventional Action will honor and support autonomous actions while coordinating a highly publicized assault on the pageantry, violence, and abuses of the Democrats and the two-party capitalist system.


Unconventional Action will target a variety of the 1,500 proposed fundraisers, countless delegate hotels, and designated institutions perpetuating global injustice. Using space reclamation, street theatre, direct confrontation, positive action, and a broad array of other tactics, we will force the national media to question the Democratic Party’s failures, hold Democratic candidates accountable for their abuses of power, and engage in
direct actions that reflect our ultimate goals of joy and liberation through creativity and confrontation.

As demonstrators organized throughout the summer of 2008, preparing for the coming convention, they predicted that 25,000-50,000 demonstrators would descend on Denver, committed to public demonstrations on the scale of the 1960s , to force the Democratic party to recognize the anti-war community in America, the crisis of global warming, the shame of sweatshops.

Bad Portents and Dismal Protests

But as I talked to delegates arriving in Denver for the DNC, I heard bad portents for the upcoming protests. On Saturday, I asked a superdelegate from Wisconsin , chairman of the DNC youth council, about his thoughts on demonstrations by groups such as recreate 68, and he answered bluntly: “never heard of them.”

Here in Denver we’ve heard plenty about such groups, and their plans to disupt the convention. Some of the demonstration leaders estimated 50,000 people would show up for Sunday’s anti-war march. The local dailies predicted 10,000 would show.

But come Sunday morning of the march, the anti-war crowd simply didn’t show. Only about 1000 showed —at least 10 times smaller than predicted. The anti-war demonstrators called for the voice of the people, but only found the voice of a few friends.

Where Were the People?

What can account for such a result? Where were the people?

As I wandered throughout the crowd of demonstrators, the answer was almost always the same—it was the paranoid fear-mongering of Denver city officials, and overblown police presence: the officials made people scared to come downtown (see reports of the action here (click link for Monday 08/25) and at dnc.kgnu.org). Or just watch these clips and look for the police…


Others suggested that the low turnout reflected the fact that the Iraq War has lost its urgency. Both parties now talk about timelines for withdrawal, fatalities are down, and domestic economic crisis has trumped other concerns. People just aren’t paying attention to the war.

Both of these reasons play a part in accounting for Sunday’s surprisingly low turnout—but the most important reason why demonstrators did not “Recreate 68”— is simply because it is NOT, any longer, 1968.

2008 is not 1968

In 1968, the Democratic nomination was entirely decided by Superdelegates—the popular vote in the primary was meaningless—and when the anti-war votes of millions in the primary were ignored by insider Democrats committed to the Humphrey, the war candidate—you can bet it catalyzed a street anger that can’t be matched today, when the popular vote is decisive in choosing the Democratic nominee.

In 1968, 18-20 year olds couldn’t even vote, though they were being drafted to fight and die in Vietnam. A lot of those young people showed up in Chicago—and registered their discontent in the streets, as the ballot-box was off limits.

In 2008, 18 year olds can vote, and they turned out in record numbers during the primaries—voting for Obama 4-1 over Clinton. Now that he’s the nominee, on the strength of the youth vote—it’s no surprise that young energy has been diverted from the streets, into the party.

And speaking of the draft. In 1968 they had one; in 2008 we don’t.

In 1968, King and Bobby Kennedy were assassinated and the party fell apart while the street exploded. In 2008, the Kennedy of our day is leading the party, while the street seeks direction.

Is 2000 1960?

In fact, 2008 looks more like the hopeful 1960 than like the angry 1968. In 1960 as in 2008, the progressive hopes and youthful energy of a nation centered on the Democratic Party and its charismatic leader, and the party had not yet proved bankrupt.

Barack will likely win this election as Kennedy did, as the hopes of the left wrap themselves into the Democratic party rather than into the passion of the street. If Obama wins, he and his party will have their chance to respond to the national call for change. Will Obama fail? Will the party that captured the hopes of a record number of primary voters prove bankrupt? Will the hopeful “yes we can” of 2008 become the disastrous Democratic disintegration of 1968? Obama will likely win this election–And then we, and the street, will see.

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The Democratic Party is too Democratic! Super-Delegate to the Rescue!

March 7, 2008

The Texas and Ohio results are in and it looks like the fate of the most powerful office in the world is now in the hands of this guy–

superdelegate3.jpg

Photo:www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/images/july-dec04/jasonrae_final.jpg

He’s Mr. Jason Rae, 21 years old and the nation’s youngest superdelegate. Texas and Ohio voters last week didn’t decide the election after all. In fact, the voters themselves, whether in Texas, Ohio, Iowa or anywhere else, may never have a chance to decide it. In the end, it may all be in the hands of the young Mr. Rae, Ms. Jenny Greenleaf from Oregon, Mr. Awais Khaleel from Wisconsin, and their superdelegate associates, who will all be free to ignore the wishes of millions of voters in their states and across the nation.


Super-Delegates Are Meant to be Anti-Democratic

Who are these super-delegates and how did they get such extraordinary super-powers—so that each of their votes for presidential candidates is equal to about 10,000 votes of normal citizens? The answer has something to do with the paradoxical Democratic party nominating process, a process resembling a tragic creature you may have read about as a child.

Doctor DoLittle called it a pushmi-pullyu—a strange creature with a head on both ends and sadly resigned to always be pulling itself in hopelessly opposite directions. Today this tragic creature is known as the Democratic party—or at least the Democratic party’s presidential nominating process, which is built around strangely contradictory impulses towards pure democracy (the direct primary with proportional allocation of delegates) and blunt aristocracy (the automatic allocation of “super-delegate” status to party officials and insiders, who are free to vote as they choose, unbeholden to any popular vote process).

It’s a strange, two-headed creature. Speaking from one head, Democrats seem to love democracy (they were the party back in the 1970s that led the way to changing state laws across the country to require the direct primary or open caucus method of nominating presidents so that voters would control the process, and they are the party allocating their state delegates through a proportional representation system). But speaking from the other head is that same Democratic party which has had enough concern with the possibly unpredictable and unwise choices of “the people,” that they came up with the idea of super-delegates in the 1980s, automatically giving party officials and assorted party insiders an especially powerful role in selecting the presidential candidate, regardless of who the people themselves might have voted for in the primary.

Superdelegates shouldn’t be intervening in any way to overturn the will of the voters, complain some, like Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi. “I think the electoral process has to work its way,” she argues.

But then again, superdelegates using their special powers to overturn the momentum of the people is exactly the way it was designed to be, and therein lies the troubling truth about the obscure institution of the superdelegate—purposely designed as an elitist cure to the excesses of pure democracy. But will voters put up with it, if the superdelegates nominate a candidate who did not win the most states or the most delegates through primaries and caucuses in the various states? In 2008 we may find the answer to whether the voters at large will accept the “cure” against their own desires—or whether the super-delegates may even now be singing their swan song in deciding their final nomination, before being banished forever by a frustrated Democratic electorate.

Over 25 million people have voted nationwide, and Barack Obama leads Hillary Clinton by about 500,000 votes in the popular vote tally. Obama also leads among “pledged delegates”—those delegates allocated according to the popular votes in their state—by a count of 1366 to 1222 (2025 delegates are needed to win).

And yet, when all is said and done, neither Obama nor Hillary is likely to win enough popular delegates to be nominated for the Presidency. Enter the superdelegates. These are people who are allowed to vote as delegates for the Democratic nominee due their status as a member of Congress, a state party official, or a former high-ranking party leader. There will be around 840 superdelegates at the Democratic National Convention in Denver—they will be free to vote as they chose—together they will constitute over 40% of the total votes needed to win the nomination, and their preferences very well may decide the final Democratic nominee.

It all sounds sort of like the smoke-filled rooms of the party bosses of old. Voters and their pledged delegates cry out to go one way—while the non-elected superdelegates and the presidential nomination itself may very well go of in the other direction. In this election what that really means is that (based on current trends) the voters and the pledged delegates look like they will end up going mostly for Obama—while the superdelegates and party establishment may go for Clinton. Add to the combustible mixture that superdelegates are much older, and much whiter, than the voters who have surged to the primaries in record numbers this year. For example, white men make up 28% of the Democratic party’s voters, and yet account for about 46% of the superdelegates. The 21 year old Jason Rae superdelegates are few and far between among the party elite—though they showed up in record droves during the primaries.

Do the Voters Need the Wisdom of the Super-Delegates?

So if the superdelegates end up playing a decisive role, will the voters themselves put up with it? How comfortable will Democrats be, especially all those young, first-time voters that surged to Obama in the various state elections, if the superdelegates exercise their superpowers and decide hand the nomination to Clinton? Perhaps songwriter Roy Zimmerman says it best in his humorous riff on the superhuman superdelegate.

It’s been a long time since superdelegates actually overturned the preferences of the voters. So long, in fact, that standard political science textbooks give little more than passing reference to the quaint, but generally meaningless, role of ‘superdelegate”—in the textbooks you will find mostly brief and innocuous discussions of these people, who have not decided an election in years, simply because the popular vote has generally been loud and clear in terms of who the people wanted as their nominee

History of the Super-Delegates

But there was a time when party insiders were in fact a major force in selecting nominees, and when they overturned popular sentiment in the primaries to select whoever they wanted. Something very much like this happened the last time in 1968, when young idealists and other Democratic activists used the primaries to push their party in one direction (towards anti-war and increasingly liberal candidates), while the establishment party leadership went another route and nominated a more centrist candidate who had actually not won a single primary all year long (Hubert Humphrey). A week of riot in the streets of Chicago followed, as young activists denounced the party elite, the Democratic party fell apart into bitter in-fighting, and the Republican candidate won the election (Nixon).

A chastised Democratic party proceeded to open its nominating process completely to the people—banning the notion of party insider nomination by “super-delegates”—and turning the entire process over the people themselves in 1972. The problem is that party insiders became concerned in the following elections that passionate Democratic activists in the primaries were nominating hopelessly liberal candidates (McGovern in 1972) or naïve and untested candidates (Carter in 1976) that became electoral disasters for the party, losing in landslides to Nixon and Reagan. “The people,” many party insiders concluded,” cannot fully be trusted with nominating their own leaders: we need to bring back the voice of wisdom, moderation, and strategic calculation that only we party leaders have.”

And so the superdelegates were designed in the 1980s, according to political scientist Rhodes Cook, as a “firewall to blunt any party outsider that built up a head of steam in the primaries,” or (in the words of Northeastern University political scientist William Mayer) to prevent any insurgent candidate “out of sync with the rest of the party.”

The number of super-delegates were increased following the insurgent success of Jesse Jackson in the 1980s—a campaign that many party insiders felt hurt their party by associating it with the overly “radical” (though popular in the grass-roots) campaign of Jesse Jackson, an African-American thought by most to be unelectable in the general election. Party leaders expanded the superdelegate institution to better muffle the voices of impassioned grass-roots activists—who were seen as a democratic force, yes—but also a dangerous force in terms of undermining the professionalism and electability of the party at large. Current Clinton advisor, Lannie Davis (who himself was part of the team who invented the super-delegate process back in the 1980s), recently reminded Americans of how important it is to allow the super-delegates to vote for anyone they want, regardless of the popular vote in their own congressional district or state. We need to avoid giving too much power to the “narrow band of base activists” who dominate the primaries, Davis argues, by which he means to limit the power of the voters themselves, or at least those that show up to vote in primaries and caucuses.

Its not surprising that insurgent, grass-roots candidates who have been hurt by the superdelegate process sin the past are not big supporters of the institution meant to protect the voters from themselves. “I certainly think their influence should be curtailed,” Gary Hart says, an outsider who fought Walter Mondale to a draw in competing for the 1984 Democratic nomination among the voters themselves, but lost the superdelegates in a landslide. In 1988 Jesse Jackson won the Puerto Rico primary in Puerto Ric over Michael Dukakis. Puerto Rico’s governor nevertheless instructed his fifty-one delegates to back Dukakis. “This is clearly machine politics,” Jackson wrote back then. “Superdelegates should have nothing to do with the 1988 campaign.” .

Super-Delegates and the Theory of Republican Governance

Its easy to paint the superdelegates as anti-democratic elitists, an institution impossibly out of touch with the Democratic spirit of our times. But on the other hand, the whole idea of elected leaders and established elites playing a special role in making important decisions in our society is nothing more than the very principle of “republican” governance on which our nation was founded (“republican” in this sense does not mean the Republican party, but the “republican” spirit of respect for wise, elected leaders to sometimes know better than activist, impassioned masses of people).

If you consult the founding documents of the American system, it is clear that most of the founders themselves might have thought very highly of the super-delegates. In James Madison’s famous Federalist Paper #10, Madison was very clear that pure democracies were dangerous—they were always susceptible to fads (Obama-Mania?), and unwise and dangerous ideas often fired up the masses (immediate pullout of Iraq?). And so Madison put his faith in an representative elite—elected by the people, but also selected by other party officials—to make more wise and careful choices on everything from policy matters to who the next Senator or President should be (the original idea for the Electoral College was that it would operate as something of a college of super-delegates, deciding the president for the people). Madison felt we should trust a system of elite, representative rule to “refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interests of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice if to temporary or partial considerations.”

And so the impassioned Obama voters are the philosophical “democrats” of the day, speaking of the need for a party to represent the voice and will of the people who vote—while the Clinton superdelegates are the philosophical “republicans” of the day, speaking of the need for a balanced and moderate choice that reflects broad party needs beyond what Davis calls a “narrow band of activists.” It’s a long debate in America with a historic pedigree of allies on both sides. You can view those two sides in a discussion in this video clip from CNN.


Will Democrats Put Up with Super-Delegates Reversing Voters’ Decisions?

American has a long tradition of trusting representatives to make important decisions for them. But it cannot be denied that the sweep of most history in America has been away from the republican spirit and towards more democracy. And so we must ask today– how much of the republican spirit of representative/elite influence can the Democratic Party sustain in its nominating process?

The superdelegates were created in the spirit of “filtering and refining” the opinions of the voters at large—but it is unlikely that voters today will be very excited as their ideas are filtered, refined….and possibly reversed. In fact, the very institution of the superdelegate hasn’t overturned a popular vote since the “days of rage” in 1968 (when superdelegates were simply called party bosses), and many people in the party certainly didn’t put up with it back then. Would they today?

Today, the superdelegates have become an acceptable modern institution, only insofar as they have been meaningless. Democratic National Committee member Elaine Kamarck has called the superdelegate a “sort of safety valve,” but there are many who predict that if the superdelegates “steal” the election from the popular vote winner they will be better described as a “self-destruction system” as the Democrats will predictably implode in bitter infighting and recriminations over an election stolen by the insiders, leading their party to a grand defeat in 2008.

America is a Republic and America is a Democracy, yes. And there are many things that Americans trust their leaders with deciding, from annual budget allocations to sending the nation to war. But there is one choice Americans may no longer e willing to trust to their leaders, and that is the choice of choosing who their leaders will be. Writing for The Nation, Ari Berman put it like this: “The 2008 campaign has again exposed the undemocratic influence of the superdelegate elite. But just as the activists of ’68 pushed aside the party bosses, forty years later voters can demand that the party’s nominee reflect their choice.”

One way that voters can make this demand for the party to reflect their choice for the nominee is to ultimately do away with the superdelegate institution altogether. That decision, of whether to celebrate and protect the institution of the superdelegate as a necessary brake on activist democracy, or to eliminate it altogether as elitist and anti-democratic—will ultimately be made by those people who choose to stick around and make their Democratic party their own, after the smoke of the 2008 election has finally settled.

…And now that you have finished a serious reflection on some weighty matters concerning the future of American democracy, you might enjoy this wholly frivolous diversion. Enjoy this mockumentary of a day in the life of that strange creature, the American superdelegate.